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1. We all have vested interests, so what's the fuss?  
In 2010-11 three government policy initiatives aroused controversy and accusations of 
special treatment for "vested interests": a change in workplace relations law to meet the 
demand of a film company; special treatment for a company in the ultra-fast broadband roll-
out; and a gambling-licences-for-convention-centre deal (details section 5b). Were the 
accusations justified? And what is a "vested interest" and where does it fit in a democracy?   
Everyone has interests and expresses and pursues those interests in various ways, individually 
and with others who are like-minded and directly or by seeking favourable rules or the 
backing of those in authority. In a sense all interests are "vested" since they are attached to 
and, in a sense, "clothe" the person or entity holding or pursuing them. And in an open, 
democratic society, their pursuit logically is an unexceptionable, natural, human interaction.  
But the term "vested interests" has acquired negative overtones of unfair, nefarious or anti-
social behaviour – that is, their successful pursuit, and sometimes just their pursuit, is in some 
way damaging. This note suggests a framework for distinguishing appropriate, natural, 
human pursuit of interests from a pursuit of interests which is injurious to the general public 
interest (defined in section 4) and some ways in which such injurious pursuit of interests can 
be countered.  
The premise for the framework is that in a well-functioning modern democracy all citizens 
are equal members, which does not imply equality of outcomes but does imply that there is a 
general public interest in interests not being pursued in such a way as to advantage some and 
disadvantage others by creating substantial new inequalities or maintaining or exacerbating 
pre-existing substantial inequalities, as defined in sections 3 and 4.  
This note is specifically set in, and speaks only for New Zealand, though some parallels are 
drawn with other modern democracies and there is some reference to practices in other 
modern democracies.  
Also, while the term "vested interests", as used in the media and common parlance, often 
implies unethical or immoral behaviour, this note does not treat the topic as matter of ethics.  
Nor is it definitive. The topic merits wider debate and the application of finer minds and 
stronger intellects.  
 
2. The dictionary definition and an alternative 
"Vested" originally meant being clothed, then possession of property, then personal interest. 
In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary [Shorter Oxford] "vested" means, in addition to "clothed", 
particularly in religious vestments, "secured or settled in the possession of or assigned to a 
person, as opposed to rights that he or she may acquire in the future" and, derived from that, 
"a personal interest in a state of affairs, usually with an expectation of gain" and "a person or 
group having such an interest". Collins [Collins] gives, first, "an existing and disposable right 
to the immediate or future possession and enjoyment of property", second, "a strong personal 
concern in a state of affairs, system, etc, usually resulting in private gain" and, third, "a 
person or group that has such an interest". Macmillan [Macmillan] gives "a special reason for 
wanting things to happen in a particular way, because you will benefit from this".  
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From these definitions this note will assume the meanings relevant to this discussion are the 
latter meanings involving "gain" and "benefit". It will also take a "vested interest" not just to 
define the interest but also to refer to the person or group which holds the interest.  
As an aside, some academic literature does not clearly distinguish the pursuit of interests 
from the generalised interest a voter has in the outcome of an election and from mere voting 
behaviour. An exception close to home is Jack Vowles [Vowles 1993] who said vested 
interests are the interests of a few with political influence that do not benefit society.  
But, because the term "vested interest" in common parlance usually implies, assumes or 
imputes ill-intent or ill-gotten gain, this note will avoid the term and instead talk of special 
interests or just interests. (However, when someone quoted uses the term in the quote it 
obviously will be kept as spoken/written. The same goes for the term as it appears in the 
references.)  
 
3. The framework: citizenship, equality and the general public interest 
The framework for consideration of the pursuit of interests in this note is a well-functioning 
modern democracy, the essence of which is taken to be equal citizenship: each citizen an 
equal member.  
[In this note "citizen" is used generically to refer to the people of a place, by birth or by 
choice-and-acceptance. The place is the nation-state, specifically New Zealand, though 
also, where the context makes clear, to a city or region within New Zealand. In the New 
Zealand context the generic "citizen" is assumed to include those with the status of 
"permanent resident".]  
Citizens in a modern, well-functioning democracy have claims in common on the resources, 
products and services of the place. They have a common interest in peace, order and security 
and in impartially-administered laws upholding that common interest and regulating their 
pursuit of their claims and interests. In a modern, well-functioning democracy citizens choose 
from amongst themselves those who make, and arrange for the administration of, those laws 
and all citizens are eligible to be chosen. Thus, the state is subject to the citizens, not the 
other way round.  
A citizen in a modern well-functioning democracy is formally equal with other citizens 
before the law and has individual and civil rights to certain freedoms, to vote and to own land 
and other property free from arbitrary confiscation by the state. In this note, this is called 
formal citizenship.  
In the twentieth century citizens collectively awarded themselves (through those they chose 
to make the laws) additional rights, including to access education, health care, housing and 
income maintenance. In 1972 the Royal Commission on Social Security declared that the 
state should ensure that "everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much like that of the 
rest of the community and thus is able to feel a sense of participation and belonging to the 
community" [Royal Commission 1972]. In this note this is called full citizenship.  
In practice citizens are not equal, even in the formal sense.  
First, they have inherent inequalities, some inherited and some acquired in the very early 
years of life. These include heritage and whakapapa, distinctive and distinguishing 
characteristics and disabilities and abilities, physique, hair, skin and eye colour, looks, 
aptitudes and inclinations, type and quality of intelligence and energy, degree of creativity or 
method, the way of seeing things, humour and introversion or extroversion. (Make your own 
list.) Citizens also differ by age and gender.  
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Second, there are attitudinal inequalities. Citizens have an unequal inherent or acquired 
interest in, enthusiasm for and commitment to fully exercising their formal citizenship 
through such actions as voting, joining with others in a common cause, making a full 
contribution (for example, by paying due taxes) and upholding the rights of all citizens to the 
benefits of citizenship. There are leaders and followers, those who instigate and innovate and 
those who acquiesce or settle for the quiet life, those who feel fully part of the society and 
nation, for whatever reason, and those who do not.  
Third, there are manufactured inequalities, different from the first two types because they are 
made, not inherent: created – by action or omission – in the law and by the state's practices, 
by custom or social structures and traditions and by economic interaction. Not all citizens 
have genuine, practical equality before the law (for example, because of cost or ethnicity). 
Some benefit more than commensurately from resources, products and services because the 
system advantages and privileges them. Systemic limitations or policies, service failures and 
failures to correct for inherited disabilities or characteristics or very-early-life experience 
deny some citizens genuine equality of access to education, health care, housing and income 
maintenance – that is, deny them genuine equality of opportunity to fully participate in the 
nation, its society and society's major subset, the economy. As the cross-party parliamentary 
health committee "Hutchison report" in November 2013 [Parliamentary health committee 
2013] made clear, drawing on extensive research, inequalities in pre-birth and early-
childhood experiences have long-lasting effects on child health, capacity to be educated, 
teenage conduct and capacity as an adult to become a full member of the workforce, with an 
income that enables full citizenship. Many are by age 3 to excluded from full citizenship 
unless they have exceptional help and/or develop exceptional willpower later in life.  
Manufactured inequalities thus, in effect, deny true justice, that is, the capacity for each 
citizen, as far as inherent differences allow, to meet all needs and take as full a part in their 
society and nation as they might wish.  
To the extent that the pursuit of interests, including success in that pursuit, reflects inherent 
and attitudinal inequalities, the effects are unremarkable and are consistent with democratic 
practice and thus are in the general public interest. To the extent that that pursuit 
manufactures substantial new inequalities or maintains or exacerbates existing manufactured 
inequalities and those inequalities are substantial, the effects will arguably be incompatible 
with true democratic practice and in that sense not in the general public interest.  
This general public interest is not the same as the public's interests, which are many and 
varied. Also, there are many publics within the general public, each with specific interests 
(section 5).  
Democracy is a contest of beliefs and ambitions. This contest is decided by majorities, either 
directly, as in a referendum, or indirectly by the elected legislature (in New Zealand, 
Parliament), mostly through its delegated ministers and their delegates, officials and other 
executive or advisory bodies.  
Referendums and Parliament are imperfect mechanisms for producing majorities. Not all 
citizens are equally informed about an issue decided by referendum and not all citizens have 
an equal interest in the outcome, which may serve a minority interest or ambition. Many 
decisions by Parliament are decided by that majority of members of Parliament which 
constitutes or supports the cabinet/ministry and Parliament delegates a great deal of executive 
discretionary decision-making to the cabinet and officials. Decisions made in this way may 
serve the interests of particular interest groups rather than the interests of a national majority.    
Elections are one corrective mechanism. But elections are infrequent. Particular policies, 
laws or actions cannot readily be changed just by voting in such a way that a different set of 
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parties constitutes the governing majority in Parliament. Moreover, while a majority of the 
public (as measured by opinion polling) may oppose a particular executive action, as with  
partial sales of state-owned enterprises in 2013-14, the constitution of the parliamentary 
majority and so the cabinet/ministry may not substantially change at the subsequent election 
if (as is usual) a majority of voters accords more importance to other factors. So Parliament 
and elections are blunt mechanisms for distilling the general public interest (as defined 
above) from the contest of beliefs and ambitions. And, while most parties, especially the big 
ones, pay close attention to opinion polls, focus groups and informal feedback from citizens 
which to some extent guide their positioning in the contest of beliefs and ambitions, and 
while there is growing interest in alternative mechanisms (section 10), particularly at local 
level, ministers and officials have wide latitude to favour some interests over others.  
In fact, most beliefs and ambitions are those of minorities: organised interest groups, pressure 
groups, non-government organisations, associations (including churches and unions); or ad 
hoc campaigns; or the unorganised expression or reflection of citizens' generation, stage of 
life (including, for example, parenthood), gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status and other 
shared characteristics. Majorities are the result of the contest among, or coalitions or 
coincidences of, those minorities. While some organised minorities seek to act in the public 
interest, or believe they do, the pursuit of most minority beliefs and ambitions is only 
incidentally demonstrably in the general public interest, as defined above. Nevertheless, if 
they do not unduly deny the needs and claims of some citizens and do not unduly deliver on 
pursuers' claims and needs their successful pursuit does not undermine that general public 
interest.   
 
4. When is pursuit of an interest injurious?   
Each citizen has a vital individual interest in eating, staying alive and being free from harm 
and has a compelling individual interest in having all necessities met, in being able to live 
with dignity and self-worth and provide well for one's children and in living under clear legal 
rules by which the authorities and other citizens abide (a rules-based system, section 5b1). 
These are legitimate interests which no democracy officially denies though no democracy 
ensures they are met for all citizens all the time.  
Citizens join together formally and informally in interest groups to collectively pursue 
individual interests when they decide joint action by many is more likely to secure their 
interests than acting individually. Unions and business associations are obvious examples. 
Political parties may also represent such group interests and have their own interests in 
winning and maintaining power and having favoured policies enacted.  
Firms are a hybrid: a firm has an individual interest but is also a collective in the sense that 
all those engaged or employed in it have an interest in the firm being profitable.  
Citizens also form associations such as charities and not-for-profit organisations to protect or 
advance the individual interests of others less likely to be able to pursue their interests 
without help. While those who organise, fund and take part in those organisations derive 
personal psychological or spiritual benefit and the managers and employees (if any) have an 
obvious pecuniary interest in their success and in that sense may be argued to be pursuing 
their individual interests, such organisations mostly enhance general welfare. This can also 
usually – but not always – be said of associations which promote animal welfare or protection 
of the physical environment or seek to enhance a suburban or urban landscape or push for 
policy change they believe will make society or the economy more equitable.  
There is nothing inherently injurious to the general public interest, as defined in section 3, in 
7 
 
 
these activities. If the competition is equal, the pursuit of any one interest will not reduce the 
realisation of any other interest more than the realisation of that interest is reduced by the 
realisation of others' interests. Of course, in practice some secure more of their interests than 
others: equal citizenship does not imply equal outcomes because people have inherent and 
attitudinal inequalities (section 3). Moreover, human society is a complex adaptive system 
and such systems are dynamic and so not in continuous equilibrium. So some inequalities of 
outcome from the competitive pursuit of special interests is compatible with a just society in 
a well-functioning democracy.  
It can also be argued, (loosely) following John Rawls [Rawls 1972], that if some secure an 
advantage (gain or benefit) through successfully pursing their interests, that is compatible 
with a just society if others are not disadvantaged. [There might also be a general acceptance 
of long-established differences – a "culture" – as noted in section 5a.]  
But large and persistent inequalities of outcomes are not compatible with a just society 
because then the citizens are no longer equal members.  
Also, full equal citizenship implies that differences in outcomes should not result from 
manufactured inequalities, as distinct from inherent or attitudinal inequalities. If the pursuit 
of a special interest of a particular person, firm, organisation or association is realised and 
results in substantial gain or benefit at the expense of a substantial disbenefit to others, that 
manufactures a substantial inequality and so is against the general public interest.  
This is the way this note will treat the pursuit of special interests. To reprise section 3:  
Pursuit of a special interest is injurious to the general public interest if its successful 
pursuit manufactures substantial new inequalities or substantially exacerbates existing 
manufactured inequalities or maintains existing substantial manufactured inequalities.  
 
5. The interaction of interest groups and the executive 
There are two principal ways in a democracy in which special interests can be pursued and 
advantages gained. One is through economic markets: establishing a monopoly, duopoly or 
oligopoly (or monopsony, duopsony or oligopsony) or a closed guild, as in some professions 
or trades, confers advantage, which may come at cost to the far more numerous buyers (or 
sellers) unless regulated. The other way is through government (central or local) policy and 
action that confers an advantage to an individual, group, sector or class. The second route is 
the main focus of this note and in fact the two are often intertwined.  
Richard Mulgan [Mulgan 2004] identified three types of interaction between interest groups 
and governments. This note will take his matrix as a convenient way of looking at the pursuit 
of interests.  
Mulgan's first type is an open or laissez-faire pluralist model in which the political system 
operates like an open market where private individuals who want to pursue interests organise 
with like-minded people into interest groups to gain benefits from the government but do not 
control decision-makers. [This is essentially similar to the notion in section 3 that democracy 
is a contest of beliefs and ambitions.]  
Mulgan's second type of interaction between interest groups and governments is corporatism. 
Interest groups are formally incorporated into the system of government, which recognises 
them as the sole representatives of their economic or social sectors. Sweden and Austria, for 
example, used to negotiate overall economic direction with representatives of industries and 
trade unions. There have in the past been elements of this in New Zealand, notably when 
wage bargaining was formally regulated by the Arbitration Court and when in the 1950s and 
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1960s governments informally arbitrated among interest groups, often behind closed doors. 
There have also been economic planning conferences (for example, 1968-69) and economic 
"summits" (for example, 1984 and 2009). Mulgan argued these models are legitimate and 
contribute positively to the operation of a democracy.   
Those who favour Mulgan's third, "market liberal" model disapprove of the first two models. 
This model is associated with "market liberal" or "new right" theories which seek to limit the 
role of the state and rely more on unregulated choices by individuals and private firms in a 
free market. In this construct, interest groups are self-interested, seeking special advantages 
or privileges contrary to the national interest.  
Mulgan's three models leave six gaps.  
The first is that in his "open market" model the "invisible hand" of that market may be 
manipulated by some interest groups which have more influence than others and that 
influence may not be in the overall public interest of the majority. That is, there are well-
connected interest groups.  
The second is that a powerful or well-connected individual or firm may secure special 
gains or advantages.  
The third is that "market liberal" arguments against special interests can be – arguably are 
– themselves a special-interest argument. Moreover, those arguing against interest groups 
may – often do – form interest groups to argue that case. The question then is: who 
benefits from such limits on the state?  
The fourth is that the coincidence of many individual special interests may constitute a 
powerful minority that prevails against the interests of the majority. In other words, 
"concentrated interests" of the few with much to gain individually prevail over the 
"dispersed interests" of the many who have little to lose individually.  
The fifth is that a "legacy" minority may be able to pass on privileges to its children in 
much the way the landed aristocracy could in the pre-democratic era or industrial 
capitalists could in early modern democracy. The educational meritocracy could be said to 
be a modern version of such a minority.   
The sixth is that of the member of Parliament or councillor who argues his/her own special 
interest or the special interest of a group of which he/she is a member.   
5a. The visible invisible hand of the market 
Mulgan's "open market" implies an ideal market, that is, one in which those who take part 
have equal knowledge and equal bargaining power: the "primitive higglers" of introductory 
economic textbooks. But there are few such markets. In almost all markets both information 
and power are asymmetrical, usually in favour of larger or more concentrated participants 
(for example, a large supermarket chain versus its many suppliers and its many customers).  
Examples of attempts to rectify this imbalance are the establishment of the Dairy Board in 
1923 to bargain with the London buyers of butter and the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act of 1894 followed by compulsory unionism in 1935 which addressed the 
imbalance between employers and employees.  
The "influence market" in which interest groups are engaged is similarly skewed. The 
presumption in a market is that of a "level playing field" in which no player or team has the 
advantage of running downhill. (To which it might be added, as Sir Kenneth Douglas used to 
say [Douglas, early 1990s] that there must also not be a strong wind blowing down the field.)   
In an ideal political system governments' arbitration of competing bids for policy, legislation 
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and other action by firms and not-for-profits, commercial and social associations, employers 
and unions, pro-economic-output and pro-environment lobbies, lower-tax and higher-
redistribution pressure groups, private and public institutions (schools, hospitals) and so on 
would be guided strictly by the general public interest (as defined in sections 3 and 4), 
distilled from free and widespread public discourse.  
In practice, governments of different parties favour different interests and therefore 
advantage some interests and disadvantage others.  
This is in a crude sense self-correcting in a democracy, by way of elections and public action: 
protests, organised campaigns, petitions and so on. However, because to some limited extent 
elections are influenced by parties' marketing capacity, which depends on donations and 
because some individuals and organisations are capable of bigger donations than others, 
elections themselves are not necessarily a corrective mechanism.  
Moreover, once a policy or legislation is put in place it becomes a new status quo and the 
longer it is in place, the more likely it is to become accepted by the public as the norm. 
(Examples: national superannuation, GST, Kiwibank and KiwiSaver.) So, while a 
government made up of different parties from the ones that instigated the policy or legislation 
might oppose something when it is introduced, if it takes office some time after the change it 
may be less likely to repeal it and the longer the delay the less likely the repeal. Something 
widely regarded as contrary to the general public interest (as defined in sections 3 and 4) at 
its inception may thus over time come to be accepted as in that general public interest 
through a sort of democratic osmosis.  
In this sense, the status quo may become part of the "culture". An example might be the 
acceptance of large income and wealth inequalities in twentieth-century United States as 
compatible with opportunity to make something of oneself. Has a culture of acceptance of 
large manufactured inequalities developed in New Zealand since the 1980s? Or is there a 
point at which such a "culture" (if it exists) breaks down, perhaps by way of a political 
populist response to stress?  
5b. Powerful, well-connected interests can finesse the "market" 
There is another way for the executive to deal with sectoral and individual interests, which 
was applied by the new Labour government in 1984. It stopped listening to arguments by 
individual firms and sectors (or individuals) for their special benefit. The criterion for 
successful arguments put to the government was that a change would deliver national benefit.  
This did not mean sector groups or large firms stopped pressing cases that were beneficial to 
the sector, firm or individual. But it did mean that to gain that benefit a case had to be 
presented that the benefit to the sector/firm/individual was also a benefit to the economy as a 
whole and the case had to argue for generic, not special action. (Though it should be added 
that the criteria themselves as to what constituted national benefit favoured some arguments 
over others – section 6, the self-reinforcing loop.) 
Broadly speaking, this national benefit "rule" still applies but there are exceptions. Notably, 
in recent years well-connected individuals or firms have persuaded ministers to respond to 
specific cases they have made which benefit them directly. They have in effect finessed 
Mulgan's interest group market.  
 In September 2010 the Australian Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance union, backed 
by several international actors unions, ramped up a bid by New Zealand Actors Equity for 
minimum conditions for filming the Hobbit film series. Sir Peter Jackson, the director, 
said these claims put at risk Warner Brothers' commitment to the film and specifically to 
the film being filmed in New Zealand: Warner Brothers did not want to deal with a 
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unionised workforce. After lawyers representing Warner Brothers met the Minister of 
Economic Development, Gerry Brownlee, and the Prime Minister and Tourism Minister, 
John Key, the government agreed on 27 October to promote special legislation in 
Parliament specifying that film workers were contractors and could not demand a 
collective agreement or take strike action. The legislation passed Parliament. The deal also 
gave Warners up to $34 million in tax concessions.  
The deal did have a large national interest component in work, business opportunities and 
promotional benefits. It included a commitment that all DVDs of the films would include 
a tourism promotional video.  
Nevertheless, it prompted criticism that the law had been changed to meet the demands of 
an individual company — a response at odds with the post-1984 principle. Professor Paul 
Roth of Otago University, an academic specialising in employment law, said the deal was 
a case of New Zealand "teetering into third world status". [Roth 2010.] And it clearly 
disadvantaged the particular employees affected and, if replicated elsewhere, would 
disadvantage employees generally.  
This was a case of specific concessions to a firm in return for it spending money here.  
 In legislation promulgated in late 2010 successful bidders for contracts to build fibre 
networks for the ultra-fast broadband project were granted a period of eight and a-half 
years in which the Commerce Commission (the regulator of the telecommunications 
sector) could not inquire into, or order changes to, the terms under which retailers of 
broadband services could access the fibre. Since Telecom's network arm, Chorus, was 
expected to, and eventually did, win most of the network building contracts, this was seen 
by competitors, retailers, consumers and all political parties other than National as 
potentially giving Chorus near-monopoly rents and this unusual alliance successfully 
campaigned through March-April-May 2011 to have the "regulatory holiday" removed – 
though the government did still guarantee that fibre builders would not be out of pocket if 
the Commerce Commission did order cuts in access terms.  
The ultra-fast broadband project is in effect a public-private partnership (PPP) between the 
government-owned Crown Fibre Holdings and companies building the fibre network 
building companies. PPPs typically involve a tradeoff between the government and the 
private company to give the contracting company reasonable assurance it will be able to 
operate profitably.  
 On 13 June 2011 Prime Minister and Tourism Minister John Key, Economic Development 
Minister David Carter and Auckland Mayor Len Brown announced a deal with Sky City 
Entertainment under which Sky City would build a $350 million, 3500-seat convention 
centre in Auckland by 2015, in return for which the government would favourably 
consider additional gambling licences and/or an extension of its gambling licences beyond 
2021 termination date. Sky City said the regulatory changes were needed to assure it of 
revenue in return for the risk it was taking. The government said it would get a convention 
centre, much needed for tourism, without having to stump up money itself.  
This prompted criticism that gambling licences were for sale to a favoured company. Mr 
Key said the additional licences would not worsen problem gambling because it would be 
foreigners who did the gambling and the changes would be subject to "full public 
submissions" because additional licences needed a change to the Gambling Act which 
imposed a moratorium on casinos.   
A subsequent Audit Office report faulted officials in the Ministry of Economic 
Development for not following strict tendering rules. (Other critics said it added to the risk 
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of more gambling addiction or just more gambling and more individual and societal cost.)  
5b1. The equalising importance of a rules-based system 
The message from these examples was that rules can be bent if the deal is attractive enough 
and if you can get the ear of the Prime Minister or other senior ministers.  
In each case it could be, and was, argued that there was national economic benefit: 
• Jobs and associated spending and promotional benefits flowed from the Hobbit deal.  
• The country's businesses and consumers will benefit from the broadband rollout; though 
it is still not clear how great the net economic benefit will be, there are two previous 
examples where such investment in infrastructure has eventually yielded national 
economic benefit, railways and the telegraph; and 
• The country gets a convention centre which will bring high-spending international 
conferences to Auckland, benefiting transport, accommodation and other businesses 
and potentially generating more.  
To which might be added the particular circumstances of a small country, where some 
projects can be achieved only by joint action by the government and a private firm.  
But the economic benefit was at the cost of favouring powerful interests – "concentrated 
interests" (section 6b) – which could get the ear of politicians. This is injurious to the general 
public interest (as defined in sections 3 and 4) because a rules-based system is an important, 
arguably critical, equalising protection of the individual interests of those who do not have 
power – that is, "dispersed interests" (section 6b). It also risks setting up a "loop" (section 6).  
[There is an obvious parallel in New Zealand's often-expressed interest in, and need of, a 
rules-based international order, since New Zealand is a very small nation-state with 
negligible military and economic strength.]  
5c. Buying well-connectedness  
One way of becoming well-connected to more effectively pursue an interest is to employ a 
well-connected lobbyist on staff (if a firm) or contract a lobbyist in a specialist lobbying firm.  
The connectedness a lobbyist in New Zealand can offer ranges from (1) introductions to (a) 
those in the cabinet/ministry who have the relevant portfolio and/or those who have most 
weight in the cabinet, (b) those in governing and opposition parties who have that portfolio 
and/or influence within the parties and (c) relevant officials in the relevant government 
agencies to (2) actual influence because of the lobbyist's influence.  
This has led to calls for registration of lobbyists and publication of their meetings with 
politicians and officials. A bill by Green MP Sue Kedgley, taken over by Holly Walker, was 
rejected by the Government Administration select committee of Parliament as impracticable 
in its original form and discharged on 22 August 2013 despite proposals by Walker to make it 
more practical.  
A number of countries do register lobbyists, without noticeable effect on the capacity for 
special-interest activity.  
A New Zealand qualifier: New Zealand is a small country: the heads of significant firms 
and interest groups meet the Prime Minister, ministers and senior officials formally and/or 
bump into them informally far more often and far more readily and frequently than in larger 
countries and so have no need to hire intermediaries for access (though they might hire them 
to influence general public opinion). A deal might develop out of such an informal meeting 
or casual encounter.  
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5d. Buying the law to drive a special interest 
A wealthy person or large firm can resort to legal action to defend or advance an interest. 
This can be expensive and so deter or defeat a person or firm with limited means from 
opposing or competing. A gagging writ or a defamation threat can silence a journalist who is 
not backed by a media firm with sufficient means and resolve. A Resource Management Act 
objection can block a small residential development or a small firm's expansion.  
This amounts to an inequality before the law, which is a cardinal principal of formal 
citizenship in a well-functioning democracy as in section 3.  
It is not new. But New Zealand appears to be becoming more litigious, that is, to be 
following the United States from the rule of law to the "rule of lawyers".  
Alternative means of dispute resolution such as small claims tribunals and mediation and 
arbitration services have been developed to improve access to inexpensive or less expensive 
dispute resolution. But are those arrangements sufficient to counter determined pursuit of a 
special interest?  
5e. Another example – or not? 
Excessive consumption of alcohol damages the health of persistently excessive drinkers, with 
flow-on damage to families and costs to the health and justice systems and other opportunity 
costs to the economy. Excessive consumption of fatty foods and sugary drinks by children is 
linked to obesity and diabetes in later life, again with flow-on damage to families and costs to 
the health system and economic opportunity costs. Campaigners, including academic 
researchers, backed often by local politicians and the police, have tried to restrict sales of 
alcohol by limiting sales hours and setting minimum prices or imposing higher taxes. Other 
campaigners have tried to restrict advertising of damaging food and drink to children, 
banning their sales in schools and imposing taxes.  
Such campaigners' success during the term of this government has been limited in the case of 
alcohol and close to zero on damaging food and drink. Campaigners sometimes blame 
"vested interests" for blocking or delaying corrective action by influencing politicians. [Stuff 
2014, Medical Journal 2007, Open Access 2011] It could be argued that if children do 
develop health problems as a result of too much fatty and sugary food and drink, that limits 
their capacity to participate fully in the workforce and society and thus denies them full 
citizenship, as in section 3, which is unfair on the children, who cannot have the knowledge 
and long-term perspective to limit their consumption.  
The campaigners assert the manufacturers' and retailers' pursuit of their interests – to sell 
more of their product – is against the public interest though it is at the least debatable whether 
their interpretation of public interest fits this note's criterion for the general public interest of 
creating, exacerbating or maintaining substantial inequalities (section 4). Against this, the 
manufacturers and retailers can legitimately claim that the great majority of the public wants 
to buy the products and that to block the sales or artificially raise the price would interfere 
with personal liberty, a core right of formal citizenship in section 3. They can legitimately 
argue that only a small minority consumes alcohol to the point of self-harm or damage to 
others. They argue that it is for parents to decide what children eat, not the state. They can 
point to industry contributions to social media campaigns and other socially responsible 
actions to offset the damage to the minority.  
Similar arguments are made in the case of gambling.  
It is a matter of debate whether in these cases the producers' and retailers' pursuit of their 
interests are injurious to the general public interest in the sense that they manufacture 
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substantial new inequalities or maintain or exacerbate existing substantial ones. On one side 
of that debate a parallel is drawn with smoking, for which the health consequences were 
convincingly proved by researchers and there has been government action to limit smoking 
through taxes, social advertising and health warnings, with, probably, plain packaging to 
come. That parallel is rejected by the other side, in part by citing other research.  
• To these examples of successful pursuit of special interests might be added the influence of 
Federated Farmers, which persuaded the government to postpone indefinitely agriculture's 
inclusion in the greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme and whose farmer-members are the 
beneficiaries of a decision to use some of the proceeds of the partial sales of state-owned 
enterprises to seed investment in water storage dams to provide more water for irrigation 
(though it can also be argued that it can enable more efficient use of river water and thus, if 
there is no additional allocation, limit the take from aquifers). In both cases, those special 
interests would be rejected by a government made up of Labour and the Greens.  
5f. A "moral" dimension 
Is there a moral dimension? Can the pursuit of apparently altruistic interests result in injury to 
the general public interest in the sense of manufacturing a substantial new inequality or 
maintaining or exacerbating a substantial existing inequality?  
It is at least arguable that there are cases where a charitable group believing itself to be acting 
in the best interests of disadvantaged people creates a new disadvantage (inequality) through 
its actions towards and impositions on those it is helping by limiting their freedom of action 
or thought and thereby in some cases affecting their capacity to learn freely and/or take part 
in the workforce at an earning level consistent with their capacity. This argument could apply 
particularly to strict religious sects or groups.  
It is also at least arguable that an environmental interest group can, by stopping investment 
and the creation of jobs through that investment, manufacture a new income/wealth 
inequality or maintain an existing one by denying people opportunity to realise an 
opportunity to earn a higher income.  
Also, in some cases some of the group's funding comes from interest groups or firms which 
have a direct interest in selling alcohol or gambling.  
This merits more inquiry than has been possible in this note.  
5g. Government agencies and special interests 
Government departments and other agencies routinely deal with special interests in the form 
of "stakeholders" to ensure policies and programmes are workable and take into account 
those whom policies and programmes most affect. This is unexceptional if any adjustments to 
policy or programmes are made in line with national interest criteria. But there is a risk of 
capture. A full analysis of the relationship of agencies with stakeholders would be 
appropriate but is beyond the scope of this note.  
 
6. The self-reinforcing loop  
Mulgan's third model is the "market liberal" model. The special interest pursued is theoretical 
or principled or ideological and usually argued on the ground that the resultant policies are in 
the national interest. Nevertheless, if successful, it can result in a privileged class or caste 
emerging which has a special interest in upholding the theory/principle/ideology. A loop can 
develop in which those whom a set of policies advantages can ensure the policies are not 
overturned or instead reinforced.  
14 
 
 
This is common in autocratic states. A twentieth century example is the implementation of 
Marxist communism in Russia/Soviet Union which privileged an oligarchy that was able to 
pass on its privileges to progeny because of its hold on power, many members of which were 
able to remain privileged and some to become even more privileged when the system 
disintegrated in 1989-90 and then morphed into a new autocracy. The ruling Communist 
party in China is another example, maintaining power despite deep changes in the ideological 
orthodoxy.  
Some argue that a modified version developed under Mulgan's "market liberal" model in 
Anglo-American countries over the past 30 years. A set of theories arguing for "more 
market" or a new "market liberalism" ascribing primacy to market mechanisms over 
government regulation and action gained enough adherents to influence and/or command 
cabinets and legislatures in Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(and over time to varying degrees in other countries). In its crude form the argument was that 
if the state did less, businesses would have more breathing space, investors would increase 
their investment in them, output would rise and, over time, incomes generally would rise with 
output – and this would serve the national interest.  
The difference between this ideological success and the seesaw of policy change with 
changes of elected government is that in this case the beneficiaries of the policies – firms, 
their managers and their investors and particularly banks and their various offshoots, whose 
incomes rose while those of the "middle class" or "working class" stagnated – had the 
connectedness and wherewithal to lobby successfully to keep the policies in place, despite 
changes of the party composition of governments. This created a self-reinforcing loop which 
largely survived even the global financial crisis precipitated by the crash of the lightly 
regulated United States banking system in 2008.  
Even governments of the centre-left, which had before the 1980s favoured the Keynesian 
"mixed economy", adapted to market-liberalism, to which they made only relatively minor 
adjustments. Market liberalism over time became the orthodoxy, in part through promotion 
and in part through the process of adaptation and acquiescence referred to in section 5a. 
This kept the influence loop in place.   
That loop appears to have been tightest in the United States, where, to quote the Buttonwood 
column in the Economist magazine [Economist 2014], reviewing a paper by Martin Gilens 
and Benjamin Page [Gilens 2014]:  
"The danger [of the system in the United States that requires candidates to raise a great 
deal of money to compete effectively] is of a vicious cycle in which politicians adopt 
policies that favour the better-off; this gives the wealthy more money with which to lobby 
politicians, which leads to more favourable legislation and so on. The surge in inequality 
over the last 30 years could perhaps be attributed, in part, to this process."  
The Buttonwood columnist wrote that the Gilens research showed that... 
"...if a proposed policy change had low support among the wealthy (one in five in favour) 
the policy was adopted about 18% of the time. When four in five wealthy people 
supported a plan, the prospects for adoption rose to 45%. In contrast, it did not matter 
whether a policy change was backed by the vast majority, or only a tiny minority, of those 
on average incomes; its chances of adoption were 30% either way. Business interest 
groups, however, were much more successful in getting their way (a similar success rate to 
the wealthy."  
Relating this to the global financial crisis and its aftermath, the article noted that "many 
people believe that Wall Street has done rather better than Main Street out of the crisis, even 
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though it was the source of the problem".  
It is noteworthy that this appeared in a magazine strongly committed to market-liberalism.  
Nor was the Economist alone. Alan Kohler, a conservative commentator in the Australian 
Business Spectator said this in a column on 2 December 2013:  
"In recent weeks I have been developing an idea – that is, trying it out in speeches – that 
inequality results when elite vested interests succeed in distorting society to their own 
ends, and the two great vested interests of the modern world are American bankers and the 
Chinese Communist Party." [Kohler 2013] 
The Gilens and Page paper was interpreted in the media as concluding that the United States 
is an oligarchy. The Daily Telegraph [Telegraph 2014] report said the study found from a 
study of 1800 United States policies enacted between 1981 and 2002 that "economic elites 
and organised groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on 
United States government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have 
little or no independent influence. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites 
and/or with organised interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status 
quo bias built in the United States political system, even when fairly large majorities of 
Americans favour policy change, they generally do not get it." When the interests overlap, 
this is "coincidence".  
In effect, the creation of an oligarchic loop amounts to capture of the policymaking process 
and in that process the creation of "rents", that is, returns from investments or labour in 
excess of what a market free of policy and other distortions would deliver. This clearly 
amounts to the manufacture of an inequality which can be substantial.  
6a. The loop in New Zealand 
It might be argued that a milder version of this has applied in New Zealand. Political parties 
depend on donations for their operational and campaign funding. Businesses are the biggest 
donors to the National and Labour parties. And in this election cycle the Greens have been 
shown to have similarly benefited from a "green" business donor. All three parties insist they 
do not make policy adjustments in response to specific donations. The National party's 
practice is that all such donations are made to the party organisation and MPs are not notified. 
Some businesses have a policy of making donations to all significant political parties. But 
businesses do pick and choose. The National party's general policy line favouring business 
coincides with higher donations from business than other parties. Some of the Labour party's 
bigger business donors are those who would benefit from Labour's industry policies. Labour 
also receives significant funding from unions which reflects both the party's origins in the 
labour movement and consequent special constitutional rights for unions and its pro-union 
labour relations policy. The Conservative party was formed by a wealthy businessman.  
Whether this form of funding of political parties reflects the influence of injurious special 
interests is a matter for debate. Donor Sky City (section 5b) did benefit from ministerial 
adjustment of a tender process but there is no evidence that that was the result of its donation, 
as distinct from its proposition just happening to fit well with ministers' aims to expand 
tourism.  
6b. Concentrated v dispersed interests 
One way in which an oligarchic loop can develop is through the advantage a relatively small, 
well-organised, well-connected, well-financed and tightly focused ("concentrated") interest 
group with much to gain from a policy or set of policies (a special tariff or lower top 
marginal or company tax, for example) has over "dispersed" interests, that is the large 
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numbers of unorganised people who individually have less to lose (or to gain from alternative 
policies) and for whom the transaction costs of mobilisation are greater.  
This, of course, applies more generally than to oligarchic loops. Where a concentrated limited 
number or small group of individuals or firms stand to gain or lose individually from a policy 
and the wider, dispersed, public stands to lose or gain less individually, governments and 
legislators often find it easier to respond to the concentrated case. [Wilson 1984] [Lowi 1984] 
An example is the refusal to impose a capital gains tax, which would come at substantial 
individual cost to some who derive substantial income from capital gain but distribute only a 
small individual gain to the great majority who do not gain income from capital gain.  
This can take place near-invisibly to the general public or at least largely below the radar.  
6c. A less obvious version of class privilege 
A less obvious version of a caste or stratum which has gained a privileged position and then 
bequeathed that privilege to its children and grandchildren is what some have called the 
"educational meritocracy": those who benefited from the greatly expanded access to 
universities in the 1960s and 1970s to get high-paying professional and managerial jobs. 
Research in New Zealand reflects findings in other countries that a child of those people was 
more likely to go to university than a child whose parents did not and that this has continued 
into a second generation. [Callister various, Treasury 2012] Ironically, many of the 
educational meritocrats argued and continue to argue for policies that would reduce the very 
inequality of incomes they individually ensure their children are on the upside of through 
education. And, irony within irony, many were among those who argued for, introduced and 
managed the market-liberal policies that accentuated income and wealth differentials.  
Bankers, business owners and investors had a special interest in economic policies which 
rewarded them and their firms financially. Educational meritocrats had a special interest in an 
educational system which disproportionately rewarded them with good livings. Both pursued 
their special interests effectively. The educational meritocrats of the Labour party, for 
example, made students loans interest-free in 2006, thus benefiting all educational 
meritocrats'  children. This may be a case of maintaining a substantial manufactured 
inequality.  
 6d. The place of nepotism  
Another version of caste or stratum is nepotism. Some argue that nepotism is an ingrained 
element in tribal organisation and consequently in iwi. It is also ingrained in family 
businesses, such as the Todd Group. Nepotism generates an inequality but it is one within a 
group, not (or not necessarily) an inequality in wider society. Nevertheless, is there possibly a 
wider issue in the routes of influence iwi have through the separate seats in Parliament and on 
one local authority, statutory advisory boards (as in Auckland) and statutory requirements for 
consultation and formal recognition in the likes of partnerships with the Department of 
Conservation? Might that possibly give iwi business special interests an advantage and, if so, 
generate the potential for successful pursuit of an injurious special interest? Addressing that 
question – if, indeed, it is a valid question – is beyond the scope of this note at this time.   
  
7. The well-connected councillor or MP  
An alternative to, or supplementary way of, pursuing a special interest is for the person 
whose interest it is or for a representative of a group special interest to win office to press the 
case. This might be said of a unionist or a business or farming leader.  
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The issue then is whether that enables the interest group to secure a gain or benefit it would 
not have secured. This may be the case at local level. An example some cite is the Canterbury 
Regional Council's impasse over water allocation and control: some councillors wanted more 
control to combat contamination of waterways and draining of aquifers, which was affecting 
city water; others representing farmers opposed that. In the opinion of one who was involved, 
farmers became concerned they would be outvoted after the 2010 elections and the 
government replaced the councillors with commissioners. It is beyond the scope of this note 
at this time to do a detailed analysis of this event.   
There does not appear to be any evidence of payment of members of Parliament to represent 
or speak on behalf of interest groups, as was uncovered in Britain or as is a matter of fact in 
the United States Congress. Many MPs in New Zealand do come into Parliament from high-
level membership of an interest group and do argue that group's interest but there is no 
evidence in the public domain that they continue to be paid by the interest group once in 
office and no evidence that the party is thereby captured by the interest group as a result of 
their presence, as distinct from as a result of the sorts of interactions described in sections 4 
and 5.  
 
8. The public is a target, too 
So far, this note has focused on the interaction of individuals, firms, sector groups and 
associations with the executive and political parties. Firms (and political candidates) also try 
to influence the general public. They mostly do this by way of public relations, advertising 
and other mechanisms in Mulgan's "open market". But some use other means.  
One largely unseen mechanism is the mining of data collected about individuals through their 
shopping, online and telecommunications activities. This has rapidly developed in the 2010s 
into a major activity which enables firms (and political candidates) to individualise 
marketing. [It has also become a serious worry about government surveillance.] While this 
pursuit of interests raises issues of individual privacy and the data-miners are advantaged, in 
some cases hugely, it is unclear whether it is injurious to the general public interest as defined 
in sections 3 and 4.  
Another activity largely invisible to the public (though recently partly exposed by United 
States media) is the payment of retainers by pharmaceutical companies in the United States to 
eminent academics who publish positive evidence about their products and/or endorse their 
products to doctors and the general public, including in academic journals, without the 
academics making clear their relationship with the companies. Pharmaceutical companies' 
gifts or other arrangements with doctors can lead to their drugs being more likely than 
competitors to be prescribed or to be prescribed when not actually necessary or even 
potentially with harmful side-effects. [Harris and Carey, 2008]  
Some climate change sceptics are similarly funded by fossil fuel companies directly or 
through think tanks. [Goldenberg, 2013] 
That some academics have in the past been co-opted and in some cases, in effect, "bought" by 
firms may reduce trust in scientists and science. To the extent that academic institutions 
and/or their staff and students are funded from general taxation, it may also be an issue of 
public policy.  
This should be distinguished from promoting some scientists' findings to contest the findings 
of other scientists where there is no payment or collusion. Science is never certain. But if 
thereby they secure policy favourable to their special interests against strong and widely 
supported scientific evidence (section 5e), that may manufacture an inequality which, if 
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substantial, would be injurious to the general public interest.  
An interesting sidelight is in this extract from "How Putin is Reinventing War" by Peter 
Pomerantsev, which refers to different constituencies in the west (anti-European Union 
"right-nationalist" parties, anti-United States far-leftists, anti-homosexuality United States 
religious conservatives) which are persuaded or enticed by a range of different messages 
from Moscow to, in effect or in fact, lobby the Russian case, in this case on the Ukraine 
standoff:  
"Influencers often appear in western media and policy circles without reference to their 
Kremlin connections: PR company Ketchum placing pro-Kremlin op-eds in the Huffington 
Post; anti-Maidan articles by British historian John Laughland in the Spectator that make 
no mention of  how the think tank he was director of was set up in association with 
Kremlin-allied figures; or media appearances by influential German political consultant 
Alexander Rahr that fail to note his paid position as an adviser for the German energy 
company Wintershall, a partner of Gazprom, Moscow's massive natural gas company 
(Rahr denies a conflict of interest)."  [Pomerantsev 2014]  
 
9. The risk is not just to the losers 
There is an irony in an excessive pursuit of special interests to the point that they are 
injurious: it can lead to damaging political or other reaction which negates the gains won by 
pressing those interests and in doing that may lower general welfare.  
A recent New Zealand example may have been the hard line by Federated Farmers against 
inclusion in the greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme and against proposals for firm 
measures to reduce fertiliser runoff pollution of waterways. Fish and Game, the pressure 
group for recreational fishers and hunters, labelled this "dirty dairying", a phrase that caught 
on and may have contributed to firming public opinion against dairy farmers and for firmer 
measures.  
More broadly, the embedding of high income and wealth inequalities by the success of the 
"oligarchic loop" in section 6 may in time provoke a response which rolls back the "loop's" 
influence and gains.  
One response is populism. To quote the Buttonwood Economist article again: "The risk in the 
long run is that the excessive influence of the better-off may prompt an overreaction. If 
resentment grows strong enough to propel populists to power, they may push through policies 
that are a disbenefit not just for the financial sector but for the economy as a whole." The 
article notes that the Tea Party was at first fuelled by resentment at the bank bailouts of 2008. 
In Europe populist parties pushing grab-bag policies promising relief that range from the far 
or racist or nationalist "right" to the hard or romantic "left" have surged since 2008 and won 
big votes in the European Union elections on 25 May 2014.  
It was on a surge of populism in a time of hardship in Germany in the early 1930s that the 
Nazis piggybacked to power.  
Populism is seldom rational and coherent or, if so, is likely to be selective in its targets and 
"solutions" which, perversely, may compound the initial problem. It can in turn generate its 
own interests and embed policies and systems which disadvantage all but those in power.  
In other words, if interest groups push too hard and are too successful, they risk a popular 
response which strips them of their gains. In the case of the ascendancy of the financial sector 
which led to the global financial crisis it could be said its self-interested (and greedy) 
behaviour has generated a big risk to business of populist anti-business policies if the 
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resultant wave of populism is not contained and reversed.  
Alan Kohler again: "Inequality, I would argue, is not caused by capitalism but by its lapses – 
that is, by vested interests that distort the system for their own purposes and capture more 
than their share. Inequality is thus caused by a failure of regulation and competition, not by 
the existence of competition." [Kohler 2013] 
Yet those whose interests prevail are often reluctant to criticise colleagues' excesses. In New 
Zealand there was very little criticism from business leaders of the conduct of finance 
companies even after they began collapsing in May 2006.   
Of course, the potential response to injurious special interests need not lower general welfare. 
Political mobilisation for a rational programme of action may raise general welfare. There is 
a glimmer of such a mobilisation in recent re-thinking of social democracy in Europe [Policy 
Network 2014] and in the re-examination of economic theory by the likes of Thomas Piketty 
[Piketty 2014] focused on addressing high inequality in democracies as a result of the 
ascendancy of the "oligarchy" referred to in section 6. This is not confined to the "left". As 
indicated above, there is also some rethinking of first principles on the "right".  
 
10. Protections, antidotes and alternatives 
To recap (section 4a), we all have vital individual interests in having necessities met and we 
have individual interests in an ordered society, under the rule of law, that is, in peace and 
security and in the opportunity for genuine participation in our society and its major subset, 
the economy. That is a function of our citizenship in a modern democracy. We not only have 
an equal claim to formal citizenship but an equal claim to full citizenship (section 3).  
While the successful pursuit of one's own interests affects others' individual interests, some 
inequality in the realisation of individual interests is compatible with full citizenship. Equality 
of outcomes is impossible and probably undesirable and in any case inconsistent with the 
inherent and attitudinal inequalities that make each human unique and gives society 
constructive diversity. In the democratic contest of beliefs and ambitions some will benefit 
more than others. But substantial inequality of outcomes and substantial maldistribution of 
benefits – the creation, maintenance and extension of manufactured inequalities – is not 
compatible with full citizenship.  
Moreover, substantial maldistribution of benefits will over time undermine peace, security 
and order and the resultant disorder may undo the gains made by injurious special interests 
(section 9).  
So it is in the general public interest (as defined in sections 3 and 4) that the successful 
pursuit of injurious interests is prevented or exposed and reversed. Prevention requires a 
strong rules-based system that takes account of the interests of the least and less powerful and 
does not advantage powerful individuals and groups (section 5b1). Exposure and reversal 
require strong institutions, a rules-based system and rigour in policymaking and political 
decision-making and in the operations of government departments and agencies to prevent 
capture and resultant rents.  
One institutional dimension is transparency: sunlight is the best disinfectant. This focuses on 
roles of the media, the parliamentary process and the three parliamentary officers, the 
Auditor-General, the Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
which can speak on behalf of "dispersed interests". To these might be added the Office of the 
Children's Commissioner.  
The role of the media essentially comes down to the degree to which they influence public 
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attitudes. This ranges from not at all, if the media take no interest in an issue, through neutral 
presentation of both sides of an issue, to actively enlisting the public on one side of an issue 
through a campaign, as in the campaign against the legal sale of synthetic cannabis and 
"party" drugs (which may have had the perverse result of driving the market underground and 
possibly more difficult to police and possibly more socially and individually damaging). A 
detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this note.  
Also beyond the scope of this note is a detailed study of Parliament's role in shining sunlight 
on potentially or actually injurious pursuit of special interests, through questions, debates and 
select committee hearings though it might be noted that Parliament's oversight is uneven and 
depends partly on particular and/or special interests of political parties and MPs. Certainly, it 
merits analysis. Another issue meriting analysis but beyond the scope of this note is whether 
the fact that there are many parties in Parliament may have increased the potential for those 
pushing special interests to influence policy. The same goes for whether reversing the decline 
in voter turnout might be a factor underpinning a "culture" (section 5a) of acceptance of 
manufactured inequalities and of the "loop" described in section 6 and 6a. And remember 
that political parties themselves have special interests (section 4 and 6a).  
At an Institute for Governance and Policy Studies workshop on Holly Walker's failed 
Lobbying Disclosure bill (section 5c) lobbyists argued that the Official Information Act, the 
Auditor-General and the media's obsessive interest in politicians' and officials' spending 
records, gifts to them and donations to political parties make improper secretive influence 
unlikely (though others argue that the "club" functions which the Prime Minister goes to and 
which people pay to attend by donating to the party may verge on being a case in point). The 
lobbyists at the workshop pointed to New Zealand's consistent No 1 or No 2 global rating by 
Transparency International for the least corruption, to media criticism of the Sky City and Sir 
Peter Jackson deals (section 5b) and recent media controversies involving interventions by 
cabinet ministers Judith Collins and Maurice Williamson that some said could conceivably be 
read as returning favours to donors. To that might be added the success of a coalition of 
business and consumer lobbyists in having the Chorus deal altered and the Auditor-General's 
critical report of officials' handling (at ministers' behest) of the Sky City deal (section 5b).  
Contrary evidence includes: Nicola White's detailed analysis of the shortcomings and 
limitations of the Official Information Act, including many ministerial frustrations of 
Ombudsman inquiries [White 2007]; continuing ministerial attempts, some carried through, 
to legislate limitations of the Official Information Act, including in the Environmental 
Reporting Bill, the Building (Earthquake-prone Buildings) Amendment Bill, the Education 
Amendment Bill which provided for charter schools, the Mixed Ownership Model Bill (for 
the partial sale of state-owned enterprises) and several sections of the Statutes Amendment 
Bill No 4 (2014); the fact that the Sky City and Sir Peter Jackson deals went ahead, a pointer 
that there will be more such deals; the fact that Collins was admonished by the Prime 
Minister but then defended; and complaints from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment of encroachments in favour of mining companies on the Conservation Act's 
protected areas.  
Another relevant institution is the Commerce Commission, which has multiple roles, 
including controlling monopolies and setting pricing parameters for oligopolies, finding and 
fining cartels and inquiring into and putting a stop to excessive exploitation of market power 
to disadvantage consumers and suppliers. The Commerce Commission set lower prices for 
copper-wire supply of broadband than Chorus wanted to charge; initially the Minister of 
Telecommunications, Amy Adams, proposed a law change to support Chorus but quickly 
backed off in the face of public, media and lobbyists' criticism. Alongside the commissioner, 
the Consumer Council represents consumers.  
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The Chorus incident demonstrates the limitation on the Commerce Commission's capability 
to counter injurious special interests: the government can, if it disagrees, change the law at 
the behest of those interests if it has a majority in Parliament.  
Even formal citizenship, equality before the law, is at risk from injurious special interests. 
Courts are one (limited) channel for redress. But a special interest with deep pockets can 
prevail in court by forcing an opponent with fewer resources to retreat from legal redress or 
opposition. To some extent that is ameliorated through alternative tribunals such as the small 
claims tribunal or by mechanisms such as mediation and conciliation. Also, "dispersed" 
interests can band together and raise funds: the Environmental Defence Society and Forest 
and Bird are examples.  
Another counterweight is better application of vetting techniques for new legislation and 
regulations to ensure they are in the national interest and not in the special interests of a firm, 
sector or association. New Zealand is one of only a handful of jurisdictions that has 
established such a process but it is still effectively in the early stages of development and thus 
so far a weak counter to strong special interests [Productivity Commission, 2014]. Related to 
this is the requirement that the Attorney-General state if legislation or regulations contravene 
a provision of the Bill of Rights Act: such statements are routinely ignored by the 
government, with impunity.  
There are other potential antidotes, most of which involve mechanisms to give "dispersed 
interests" a stronger voice.  
One is citizens' campaigns, protests and petitions. A huge petition in 1973 to Parliament to 
"save Manapouri" dissuaded the National government from pursuing a plan to raise the level 
of the lake by 6 metres as part of a plan for a new hydro-electricity generating plant which 
would have done unsightly damage to the native bush surrounding the lake. Many of those 
who signed the petition were National party members, including some high-ranking ones in 
the party outside Parliament. A similar sentiment, again including many in the National party, 
quickly dissuaded a National-led government in 2010 from prospecting for and exploiting 
minerals in land administered under section 4 of the Conservation Act.  
Citizens can petition for a referendum (a citizens-initiated referendum) which must be held if 
more than 10% of enrolled voters sign a petition (subject to verification of a sample). But the 
referendums are non-binding and none which has passed since they were legislated for in 
1993 has been implemented by the government. A recent example: when a petition with 
18,500 more verified signatures than the required 308,753 secured a citizens-initiated 
referendum opposing partial sales of state-owned electricity companies and the referendum, 
which was held over three weeks from 22 November to 13 December 2013, passed 67.3%-
32.4% (on a turnout of 45.1%), it was dismissed by the government which claimed a mandate 
for the sales because it had said in its 2011 election manifesto it would do them, a claim, in 
effect, that the sales were in the national interest and the public had endorsed them.  
So far there is no avenue for citizens to force a binding referendum through a citizens 
initiative, as there is in many states in the United States and in Switzerland. And in any case, 
there is a risk, which would need to be carefully managed and countered, that injurious 
special interests could both initiate self-serving referendums and co-opt initiatives to serve 
their ends, as frequently happens in the United States. That happens less in Switzerland,  
which suggests Switzerland could usefully be drawn on to guide New Zealand practice.  
Another option is a citizens assembly or jury. A randomly selected stratified sample of 
citizens deliberates over an extended period, with expert input, and makes recommendations 
which are binding on the legislature. This was used in British Columbia over 11 months in 
2004 to determine whether to introduce proportional representation. The assembly 
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recommended in favour but the resultant referendum failed (by 2.3%) to reach the 60% 
threshold for change. More recently, a citizens assembly, called a convention, in Ireland in 
2013-14 proposed on 31 March 2104 a range of constitutional or civil rights changes which 
the legislature has undertaken to put to referendums. (Constitutional convention 2014)   
An alternative to Mulgan's "open market" of interest groups is collaborative governance, 
adapted from Scandinavian practice. So far there has been only one in New Zealand, the 
Land and Water Forum (LaWF), involving 59 interest groups ranging from environmental 
and recreational advocates to industry, farmers and local government, which deliberated over 
three and a-half years, producing recommendations broadly supported by the government and 
main opposition parties. Regional versions are now being set up to deal with detailed 
catchment matters, including allocation. The LaWF had the backing of the government, 
which encouraged interest groups to engage, but government backing might not be necessary 
if interest groups see it as in their overall interest to reach durable compromises rather than 
take their chances on Mulgan's "market". Some in the health sector are exploring that 
possibility. One criticism of this mechanism is that it leaves out the "dispersed interests", the 
general public. But that dimension can be added in at the political stage when the forum's 
recommendations are translated into law.  
Another way of potentially checking undue influence on policy is "working groups" of 
experts, as the present government has used for capital markets, tax and welfare reform. A 
criticism of that mechanism is that the working groups themselves may reflect biases in 
favour of some interests over others.  
There is a range of other mechanisms of varying potential, including the use of online 
mechanisms to encourage citizen feedback and suggestions, particularly by local councils but 
to some extent by the central government. These might over time gather weight, though it is 
too early to tell. The important issue is that supplements to representative democracy are 
evolving and the trend towards this so-called "participatory democracy" or "citizens 
participation" does seem to be gathering some momentum (though still very unevenly, 
intermittently and often issue-specific or group-specific). So it might be that over time 
"oligarchies" are less likely to form and/or be able to dominate policy and individual firm or 
sector lobbying may be less successful.  
 
11. An inequality checklist 
The cornerstone criterion in this note by which pursuit of a special interest is judged to be 
injurious to the general public interest is whether it manufactures a substantial inequality or 
maintains or exacerbates an existing substantial manufactured inequality. Given that the level 
of income and wealth inequalities is high and has risen greatly since the 1980s and so has put 
full citizenship beyond the reach of large numbers of citizens, that suggests the level of 
successful pursuit of injurious special interests has also been high, at least in the sense of a 
loop having developed which generates and protects policies that benefit those already 
benefited. Within that loop there are examples of specific injurious interests.  
That suggests that there is cause for a more informed and comprehensive inquiry than this 
cursory note and for a programme of action developed from that inquiry. That programme 
would not constrain the pursuit of special interests, which is a core part of the contest of 
beliefs and ambitions at the heart of a healthy democracy. But it would strengthen the 
monitoring and exposure of the pursuit of those interests if that pursuit is injurious to the 
general public interest, which is the antithesis of a healthy democracy.  
The aim would be that each citizen has full equal membership, the essence of a democracy.  
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